



PROJECT
OPEN

**MUSLIM RADICALIZATION
IN SELECTED AREAS OF EUROPE:
AFFILIATION PROCESSES AND
COUNTERING STRATEGIES**

MAIN RESULTS OF
THE RESEARCH REPORT

July 22 - 2020

The logo for Project OPEN, featuring the word "OPEN" in a bold, sans-serif font. The letter "O" is replaced by a blue circle containing a white right-pointing triangle, and the letter "N" is replaced by a blue square containing a white left-pointing triangle.



Contents

Introduction, 1

1 Desk Analysis, 2

1.1 Structure of the comparison, 2

1.2 The first Part: The context, 2

1.2.1 *Social situation (unemployment, discrimination), 2*

1.2.2 *European feeling of belonging, 3*

1.3 The second Part: The process of radicalization, 4

1.3.1 *Subject Exposed, 4*

1.3.2 *Online / Offline, 6*

1.3.3 *Radical actors, 6*

1.4 The third Part: Conclusions, 7

2 Field Analysis, 10

2.1 Summary of the Results, 10

2.2 Radical Online Data in Italy and Spain, 11

2.3 Radical Online Data in France and Germany: A Comparison of the Content, 11

2.3.1 *The State against Muslims, 12*

2.3.2 *The Society and Muslims, 13*

2.3.3 *Salafists and Muslims, 14*

2.3.4 *Believers and Non-Believers, 16*

2.4 Violent Propaganda, 17

3 Evaluation of the Questionnaire, 18

3.1 In General: About the Participants, 18

3.2 Challenges for young People, 19

3.3 Radicalization of young Muslims, 21

3.4 Statements regarding a possible campaign, 24

References, 26



Introduction

The report summarizes the results of the Open Project: Working Package 2. The following text is structured into five chapters.

The first introduces the topic by explaining the phenomena of radicalization.

The second is comparing the theoretical analysis (desk analysis) of the partners inside their countries.

The third chapter describes the practical analysis (field analysis). It presents the main aspects and results of the online research activity. Furthermore, it is also interpreting the data in graphics and text. The commonalities and differences inside the partners countries are explained.

The fourth chapter analyses the online survey that was available in five different languages on the projects' website. Not all questions are presented and compared with each other, but the most important are listed in the Chapter. CSOs (Civil Society Organizations) and social workers were able to answer questions that were gathered inside on of the first partner meetings in January. The answers can give us an overview of the circumstances in the partners local area and will be useful for the decision making and possible cooperation's later.

The Fifth Chapter lists a selection of tackle opportunities. That can be helpful and can be integrated into a strategy that prevent the radicalization of young Muslims. For further information and a more detailed plan please note that the document *Recommendation for CSOs* is opening the practical aspects of prevention work.



1. Desk Analysis

1.1 Structure of the comparison

In the following pages we will summarize and compare the results of the extensive desk analysis of our partners from Italy, Germany, France and Spain. The four analyzes dealt with a total of 18 questions from three points of view:

- the context
- the process of radicalisation
- responses to the phenomenon and good practice

The first part was about examining the social, economic and cultural situation of young Muslims in a local and national context. According to the basic approach of the OPEN project, these additional backgrounds are extremely important to understand the process of radicalization. Finally, it was also important to examine the self-image of young Muslims and see whether European thinking and the feeling of belonging to one's own society play a role in it.

In the second part, local and national peculiarities of the radicalization process were analyzed. It was important to define those youth groups that are particularly at risk from radicalization. In addition to examining the most important factors for susceptibility to radicalization, the topics that radicals frequently address were also collected. It was also especially important to back up the theoretical dispute about the influence of social media on possible radicalization with practical experience on site.

In the third part, we examined the various government offers and civil society programs for prevention and deradicalization. We were also interested in appreciating the efforts of Muslim organizations and recognizing their prevention work. At the same time, we tried to find an overview of good suggestions for prevention work with young people in the literature of the participating countries.

1.2 The first Part: The context

1.2.1 Social situation (unemployment, discrimination)

In general, the social and employment situation of young people is now seen as an important factor in the event of radicalization. An example from Italy shows this concrete danger:

Considering the profiles of the 125 foreign fighters related to Italy analyzed by ISPI (Institute for International Political Studies), we find that 44.8% of the total was employed in manual labor; 8% had a desk job; 2.4% of them were students and 34.4%, the largest percentage of them, were unemployed. Infor-



mation on the education of foreign fighters related to Italy are available for 81 individuals of the 125. Of these, 87.7% had a level of education that can be defined as low, while only the remaining 12.3% had a level that can be characterized as medium-high.

Spain

At the same time, the example of Spain shows that more and more Muslims are also striving for a higher degree. According to an essay written by UCIDE and the “Observatorio Andalusi” with data from the 31st December 2018, there are 312,498 Muslim students in Spain, from those 179,357 are immigrants and 133,141 have the Spanish nationality.¹

In **France**, but also in all other countries, the experiences of discrimination of young Muslims in the world are repeatedly mentioned. According to a survey by the French survey institute (Ifop) 42% of Muslims living in France reported to have been subjected to at least one form of discrimination (in a control by the police, when looking for a job, when looking for houses) at least one time in their lives.²

Germany

In addition, the Federal Government Commissioner for Migration writes in her report 2014: “Between people with and without a migrant background, there are still significant differences in the income structure, the distribution of working time, the type of employment and the professional status.”³

As a result, the at-risk-of-poverty rate for people with migrant background (26.8 per cent) is still significant. It is more than twice as high as for persons without this context (12.3 per cent, acc. to Microcensus 2012).⁴

1.2.2 European feeling of belonging

The question of a European identity of young Muslims living in Europe has been widely discussed in recent years. However, many Muslims reject the term “European Islam” because it contradicts their understanding of Islam as a universal religion. However, many young Muslims are committed to the idea of “European Muslims” because they were born in Europe, see themselves as its citizens and understand their faith practice in harmony with European values.

¹ Demographic study of Muslim population. statistical exploitation of the census of Muslim citizens in Spain referred to as of 12/31/2019. <<http://observatorio.hispanomuslim.es/estademograf.pdf>.

² IFOP, Etat des lieux des discriminations et des agressions envers les musulmans de france, <https://www.ifop.com/publication/etat-des-lieux-des-discriminations-et-des-agressions-envers-les-musulmans-de-france/>, 2019, accessed 10 April 2020, p. 7.

³ Die Beauftragte der Bundesregierung für Migration, Flüchtlinge und Integration, 10. Bericht der Beauftragten der Bundesregierung für Migration, Flüchtlinge und Integration über die Lage der Ausländerinnen und Ausländer in Deutschland (Oktober 2014), <https://www.bundesregierung.de/resource/blob/973812/430396/34552fb4d869bfe17d5fb731b82ca49a/2014-10-29-lagebericht-presse-kurz-data.pdf?download=1>, accessed 25 April 2020, p. 19.

⁴ Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, Handlungsempfehlungen zur Auseinandersetzung mit islamistischen Extremismus und Islamfeindlichkeit, 2015, p.31.



As the following example from Italy shows: there are quite different positions regarding the self-image of young Muslims. The desk analysis from Italy reports on such a debate: as for the “new generation” at the head of the GMI organization, however, we can understand its orientation towards Europe thanks to a conference held in June 2015, in Crema, entitled “Integration? No thanks! Peaceful coexistence.” Obviously, the title of the conference already provoked several reactions. “We know that the title has caused a stir,” says Said Hajaouan, of the Crema’s GMI’s, “but it’s a very good title. It was a precise choice. For our point of view, rather than integrate, we should live together in a peaceful way. Integration, in some way, involves losing something of oneself: instead, it is right that everybody can take in its territory, its religion, its culture”” Then he goes on to say: “How happens in nature, diversity equals progress. In an environment, biodiversity increases when the quality of life is such that different species can coexist, in our opinion that environment is [the] best.”⁵

Ultimately, it is always an experience of discrimination that prevent young Muslims from being more strongly identified with European society. All analyses from the 4 countries report numerous experiences of discrimination against young Muslims. Many of them are frustrated that they are perceived by European majority societies as “foreigners” or “immigrants.” A passage from the Spanish desk analysis reminds us of this:

According to national and international polls, there is a feeling of rejection towards Muslims and a link with terrorism and Muslim immigration is drawn. Anti-Muslim tendencies have a worrying effect in the discrimination in key areas for inclusion, such as work, education or housing⁶. One thing is for sure, if social inclusion is not happening at a local level, it cannot occur at a European level, in which the main religion attributed is Christianity; forgetting about all the legacies left like during the era of Al Andalus. However, despite the beliefs, Corinne Torrekens, researcher at the Free University of Brussels, pointed out a result of his studies that report: “Muslims who are more religious are not less integrated or politically less active. According to our data, religion does not have an impact on integration.”

1.3 The second Part: The process of radicalization

1.3.1. Subject Exposed

In principle, it can be said that there is a similar risk situation in all European countries with regard to the possible radicalization of young people. There are no fundamental differences between the countries. All the following fac-

⁵ S. Zaninelli, Crema. Il valore della differenza secondo i Giovani musulmani. Sabato il convegno su integrazione e convivenza pacifica, www.cremaonline.it, giugno 2015.

⁶ El Mundo. (2007). “El rechazo a los musulmanes en España es una realidad creciente”, según estudios de la UE. El Mundo.



tors of the radicalization process are known in research, regardless of their ideological content:

1. An authoritarian upbringing; especially if there also was an experience of internal violence inside the family.
2. Conflict-laden family relationships, often in connection with parental separation.
3. A fragile personality in adolescence with low social resonance and underdeveloped resilience.
4. Experiences of discrimination that could not be processed. Sometimes it is not an individual record of discrimination, but a collective one (being a “Muslim”) that contributes to radicalization processes.
5. The opportunity to get in touch with scene members, which ultimately random.

Italy

Renzo Guolo, professor at Padua University, in his book *Jihadisti d'Italia* (Jihadists of Italy), describes various profiles of people who have become radicalized in Italy, which seem to have in common, in addition to young age, that of being second generation immigrants and alien to national Muslim religious circles and theological doctrines in general. Common characteristics are solitary activation, resulting from the interweaving of personal suffering and radicalization, of individuals who are not part of organizations, who have never shown any radical Islamist sympathies.⁷

Germany

In Germany, the Office for the Protection of the Constitution monitors various groups in the radical Muslim milieu. The office divides "radical" Muslims who are prepared to use violence or Muslims who comply with the law but pursue radical goals in the long term. Domestic intelligence reports are published regularly and therefore exert great social pressure on those circles known as extremists.

The example of Germany and Berlin shows that a growing Salafist scene is taking care of young people in a major European city. In recent years, a *Salafist* infrastructure has developed in Berlin, with a wide range of activities. These include mosque associations, lectures by relevant preachers, Islam lessons and seminars, but also the distribution or sale of the Koran or corresponding literature at information stalls. Agitators and their followers prefer to meet in small private, partly conspiratorial circles, in private homes. *Salafist* ideas can there be conveyed “in unfiltered form” in the exclusion from the public.⁸

⁷ R. Guolo, *Jihadisti d'Italia La radicalizzazione islamista nel nostro paese*, Edizioni Angelo Guerini e Associati, 2018.



1.3.2 Online / Offline

The various studies also examined the importance of online media in the process of radicalization. Basically, there are strong opinions that relativize the importance of online influence on the radicalization of adolescents.

Here are two notable individual points from the analysis from Italy and Spain, which are mentioned here as examples for that thesis.

Italy

Three places are considered in the studies the most likely for radicalization, two offline and one online: mosques, prisons and the web. The tightening of controls in recent years has led to concealment in all these places. However, mosques that represent extremist circles of influence are identified. Prisons are considered a typical place of recruitment by extremist movements. Among the problems in this context is the perception of institutional discrimination against Muslims, who are also deprived of some of their religious rights guaranteed to Christian prisoners, such as the presence of places of worship and access to religious personnel.⁹

Spain

According to the study made by “Real Instituto Elcano”, the process of radicalization is divided in two parts; people that are radicalized in online channels and people that the process of radicalization takes place in an offline environment. The study of 178 detainees between 2013 and 2016 in Spain was carried out to examine the form of radicalization of the subjects. It talks about the social links between the people radicalized and through which channels they radicalize. The majority of the cases are in a mixed environment; online and offline, with a percentage of 40,3% of the total of the cases reviewed in the study.¹⁰

However, when we separate the online and the offline environment, there are more cases online than offline. People that were radicalized only by internet and social media were a 35.3% than the 24.4% offline.

1.3.3 Radical actors

Potential actors who strive for radicalization of young people in Europe are mostly organized across Europe. The rhetoric of these groups does not differ in Europe, since Islam is understood as a universal world religion. In Italy, France and Germany in particular, some radical groups are assigned to the *Muslim Brotherhood* or the *Salafist* scene.

The various agencies responsible for the protection of the constitution in Germany

⁸ Bundesamt für Verfassungsschutz, Verfassungsschutzbericht 2018, 2019, p.56.

⁹ R. Guolo, *Sociologia dell' Islam*, Editore Mondadori Education, 2016.

¹⁰ Reinales, F., García-Calvo, C., & Vicente, Á. 2017. 'Dos factores que explican la radicalización yihadista en España'. Real Instituto Elcano Royal Institute. 9 aug.



publish a large amount of information each year on the political assessment of Muslims living in Germany. In Germany, all larger groups from the spectrum of “political-Islam” are active, mostly with connections across Europe. The larger organizations also have partner organizations in other European countries.

The Constitutional Protection Service also officially observing some member organizations of the Coordination Council of Muslims (KRM), in particular the IGMG (*Milli Görüs* – member of the Islam Council) and organizations that can be attributed to the Muslim Brotherhood (until recently full members of the ZMD, now their membership is suspended). These organizations, which are clearly non-violent, are assigned by the VS to the so-called “legalist” political Islam.

On the initiative of the VS, the German Federal Ministry of the Interior has also banned some associations from the openly extremist spectrum (e.g. *Hamas, Hizbutahrir*).

In recent years, the protection of the Constitution has been particularly attentive to Salafism:

According to the constitutional protection service, puritanical, political and jihadist Salafists share the same ideological basis. They differ primarily in the choice of means by which they want to achieve their goal, a “Salafist theocracy.” Political Salafists are trying to spread their ideology through intense propaganda activities – which they call “proselytization” (Da’wa) – and to change society in a long-term process according to Salafist norms. In some areas, however, supporters of political Salafism explicitly oppose terrorism, highlight the peaceful character of Islam and avoid open calls for violence.¹¹

1.4 The third Part: Conclusions

In the countries examined here, there are now many programs for prevention work. The Islamic organizations involved are increasingly successfully in this. Muslim contacts are often preferred by Muslim young people. Here are some of the programs mentioned:

Italy

Several initiatives have been undertaken in collaboration with the Italian Ministry of the Interior, the most significant of which is the drafting of the *Italian Pact for Islam*.¹² UCOII, for example, in collaboration with the DAP (Department of Prison Administration), has carried out an experimental program of spiritual assistance in prisons. The program took place in eight Italian prisons, those with the hi-

¹¹ Bundesamt für Verfassungsschutz, Verfassungsschutzbericht 2018, 2019, p.194.

¹² La Repubblica, Islam, firmato Patto con associazioni di musulmani. Viminale: “Verso l’intesa”, https://www.repubblica.it/politica/2017/02/01/news/viminale_moschee_minniti_islam-157375602, last access 16/03/2020.



ghest number of Muslim inmates, and consisted in the access of imams and ministers of religion to these prisons.

The IERS⁴⁶ and SORAPS⁴⁷ projects, funded by the European Union, are also part of the school and with a specific focus on religious issues. Both projects provide online content for the training of teachers on the history of religions, as well as materials for the realization of lessons in class both on individual subjects and through thematic paths.¹³

France

A training program in the prevention of radicalization for public officials and in particular staff from the Nice Academy was launched in the Alpes-Maritimes prefecture in 2014. A session was held on December 15, 2015 at the Jean Giono college in Nice, in the presence of Michel-Jean Floc'h, inspector of academy (Ia-Dasen) of the Alpes-Maritimes and the sub-prefect of the Alpes-Maritimes Sébastien Humbert. A booklet has been distributed in schools to prevent radicalization and inform teachers on the enrolment process and how to alert and support the students.¹⁴

Alongside the teachers and educational teams, many actors and partners of the School work with the students of the academy to make them aware of the dangers of the Internet and social networks. The “juvenile delinquency prevention brigade” (BPDJ) of Cagnes-sur-Mer intervened on March 31, 2017 with around sixty students accompanied by the Mission to Combat School Dropout in the Alpes-Maritimes.

Social networks and in general all web 2.0 type services have become established in a few years as “essentials” of the web for young people. But their use is not without danger. Alongside the teachers and educational teams, numerous actors and partners of the School (academic security mobile team, National Police, associations, journalists, etc.) work with students to make them aware of the dangers of the Internet and networks. social.

After an official presentation on February 2018 in Lille, on the 11 April 2019 French Prime Minister initiated an inter-ministerial committee for the prevention of delinquency and radicalization to review the National Plan for the Prevention of Radicalization (PNPR). The Action Plan is involving multiple Ministries and is organized along 5 main lines:

1. Protecting minds from radicalization
2. Complete the detection/prevention mesh

¹³ <https://iers.unive.it/> and <https://soraps.unive.it/>, last access 16/03/2020.

¹⁴ Ministère de l'Éducation Nationale et de la Jeunesse, Prévenir la radicalisation des jeunes, http://cache.media.education.gouv.fr/file/02_-_fevrier/76/8/Prevenir-la-radicalisation-desjeunes_390768.pdf, accessed 17 April 2020.



3. Understanding and anticipating the evolution of radicalization
4. Professionalizing local actors and evaluating practices
5. Adjusting disengagement

(official and governmental website on the topic)¹⁵

Spain

Spain established a strategic national¹⁶ plan to fight against violent radicalization. Its objective is to create an efficient instrument of early detection and neutralization of outbreaks and hearts of violent radicalization, acting on those communities, groups or individuals in situations of risk or vulnerability.

The Ministry of Interior of the Spanish government created in 2010 the PEN-LCRV¹⁷ and it was recently approved. The National Strategic Plan to Combat Violent radicalization want to end up with radical movements in Spain through social awareness and a group work between government and citizens. The objective of the Plan is to “constitute an effective instrument for the early detection and neutralization of outbreaks and focuses of violent radicalism, acting on those collectives or individuals in a situation of risk or vulnerability.”

Cyberspace: The PEN-LCRV assumes the Internet as the free space for information and communications. In this area, the State will focus solely on ensuring that information systems, in general, do not constitute a means for radicalization violent, nor for the training and indoctrination of terrorists and the spread and achievement of its ends. Cybersecurity poses the threat of terrorism by the use of the Internet by groups or terrorist individuals, as an instrument to commit propaganda activities, communication, text dissemination, training, financing, recruitment and obtaining information, all thanks to the growth of social networks, the increase in Internet users in the world and the constant technological advances. All this supposes a necessary technological evolution that, nevertheless, can also become difficult to investigate their activities.

Germany

At the national level, there are numerous prevention programs in Germany. Because of the large presence of Muslims in Berlin, there are also numerous, smaller and larger organizations that look after young people. Under the auspices of the Berlin Police President, the Berlin State Program for Radicalization Prevention is coordinated by the Berlin State Commission against Violence and carried out in cooperation with the State Office for Equal Treat-

¹⁵ Comité interministériel de prévention de la délinquance et de la radicalisation, Le Plan National de Prévention de la Radicalisation (PNPR), <https://www.cipdr.gouv.fr/prevenir-la-radicalisation/mise-en-oeuvre-du-pnpr/>, accessed 06 April 2020.

¹⁶ CITCO, Secretaría Estado Seguridad. 'Plan Estratégico Nacional de Lucha contra la Radicalización Violenta'.

¹⁷ CITCO, Secretaría Estado Seguridad. 'Plan Estratégico Nacional de Lucha contra la Radicalización Violenta'.



ment – Against Discrimination. In this area, there are offers specifically for the education and deradicalization of young people, here among others the following organizations are active:¹⁸

- Interdisziplinäres Kompetenznetzwerk Deradikalisierung (Denkzeit-Gesellschaft e. V.) (Thematic workshops with experts from science and practice)
- Jugendliche vor Radikalisierung schützen (KIGa e. V.) (Social prevention)
- Interreligiöse Workshops und Begegnungstreffen Extrem Demokratisch - Muslimische Jugendarbeit stärken (RAA e.V.) (Multiplier training for young Muslimas who volunteer youth work in mosques. Workshops for detained and released young people and adolescents from prisons.)

In summary, it can be said that, especially in Germany, enormous funds are used for national and federal prevention work. In all countries there is a tendency to involve Muslim organizations in this work. At the same time, it is striking that there are only a few meaningful studies on the real situation of young Muslims in Europe. It is evident that widespread discrimination experience and the feeling of lack of recognition among Muslim young people makes it more difficult for them to find a stronger European-Muslim identity.

2 Field Analysis

2.1 Summary of the Results

All the Partners of the Open project analyzed Content on the Platforms (YouTube, Facebook, Twitter, Instagram, and Telegram), that can be attributed to radical Islamism.

The scope of this activity is to detect how radicalization took place in social networks. Collecting data is fundamental for the projects implementation as far as it allows to understand how some ideas were spread out in the online field.

In Italy and Spain, the results were few and the Channels had a small number of participants. The results of radical elements show for both countries the recurrent topic of global Zionist conspiracy. The few results show, that there was not much evidence of a radicalization of young Muslims. The Task show that a radicalization process regarding both countries is not taken place in On-line Platforms, with open access. Close groups and chat rooms were not analyzed and are not part of the searching activity. It can be possible that the radicalization is taken place from face-to-face contact.

¹⁸ Der Polizeipräsident in Berlin, <https://www.berlin.de/polizei/aufgaben/praevention/islamismus-salafismus/artikel.754578.php>, accessed 18 April 2020.



In France and Germany, the Data that has been collected, should be under further review. Most of the Content is peaceful and against violence. In the following the data is described to understand better the Salafism Movement in both countries. All the results are split up into categories to compare the data. In total 5 categories were selected.

2.2 Radical Online Data in Italy and Spain

The Content that was collected in Italian language is drawing a violent picture of Democracies regarding their foreign politics in the middle East. The US (“America”) is often only seen under the aspect of his foreign politics in the middle East. An Aggressor that prevents peace for Muslims inside Countries of North Africa, the Middle East, Afghanistan.

The critical aspect of the Content can be found with wrong facts, in a one-sided presentation. Victims are Muslims, Aggressor is an Opposing force: “Zionists”, “US-military”, “Democracies”.

The Content in Spain is as well focusing on foreign politics. The enemy is the state of Israel, that is oppressing Muslims in Palestine and therefore should be disrespected by Muslims. The country is described as an illegal or illegitimate state. The Posts regarding Israel are indicating that nothing good in general can be expected by the country and is closing any room of possible conversation or dialogue by linking the state of Israel to evilness and crimes against innocent (Muslims).

One Post is indicating the Support for anyone that kills people that are Loyal to Bashar Al Assad. The Syrian civil war is one of the deadliest of the 21st century. Foreign Forces, and Syrians are fighting each other in various combinations.

The Posts being discovered in Spain and Italy are similar to the ones in Germany and France regarding foreign politics of democracies. The Viewer should be addressed to not passively watch the harm Muslims all over the World have to suffer from. In the Posts the “West” or Western democracies are seen connected with Crimes against Muslims, all over the world by supporting Nations that are harming Innocent Muslims. The religious connection between believers inside Islam is often addressed, as well as the Muslim Community that is not actively doing something against the crimes.

2.3 Radical Online Data in France and Germany: A Comparison of the Content

The data of both Countries was divided into 6 categories. Each category can be understood as a topic that is explained in the following subchapters.



The first category “The State and Muslims” describes the relation between state and believers. The authors of the content are interpreting what most Muslims should think about the democratic system, and how they should act in it. How do they recognize the democratic system and state authorities?

The Second Category “The Society and Muslims” is informing about the connection between the Content and the Society. How is the society defined, and how is it seen?

The Category “Salafists and Muslims” is describing the relation between the group members and their understanding of most Muslims living inside France and Germany. It is important to understand how they are separating themselves from the wider Muslim Community. What are they expecting from Muslims and how do they see themselves?

The Subchapter “Believers and Non-Believers” formulates the relation between other religions and to the non-Muslim majority inside their country. Its goal is to understand what the struggles for them are living inside their environment. How and why are they separating themselves from other people inside pluralistic societies?

2.3.1 The State against Muslims

The Content is showing two opposing systems. The First System is the present one, a democratic system. Muslims should not participate in elections; it is seen as a creation made by humans and not comparable with the law of God (sharia). The state is defined as an Islamophobic force that is attacking the religion and promoting violence against Muslims in a strategic manner. The goal is to change Islam to something that non-Muslims prefer the Religion to be and therefore change Muslims to their behavior. The “constantly attack” is often described as an attack against the purity of the Religion and his meanings. The democratic system is not something the authors of the posts see themselves as part of. A picture between aggressor (state) and victim (Muslims) is drawn. In conclusion, believers should take Islam (in the Salafist understanding) as a protection and opposing force against a brutal and racist state.

The second System (Caliphate) is seen as an alternative to a decadent system (democracy) and the only legit form of state for Muslims to live in. A caliph is removing the disagreements (many different opposing opinions) under the Muslims in a strap of unity.

The content makes clear that Muslims should decide between one of the two systems. Scholars that are promoting different possibilities that allow Muslims to consider a participation in a democratic system are false preachers, corrupted



by the non-believers and are acting against the truth.

The content of Germany and France is showing differences concerning two topics.

The online research in Germany analyzed two Channels that were supporting Prisoners that were accused of supporting Terror Organizations (mainly IS). A research of the reasons why the person that are named are in Prison make it clear that they can be a danger of the society and it is opening the question why they should be free, like the authors of the Channels promoted. Victim and Aggressor are changed in the logic of the Channels. And what people are considering as justice is changed into injustice.

In France, the Topic of Laicity was discussed on Twitter. It is understood as insurmountable separation between a believer and his religious freedom. The education inside the French school system is described as danger for children because they are not educated in religious sciences. The promoting of education that is seen as not comparable with Islam is addressed and described as an attempt of the state to convert Muslims to non-Muslims. The content regarding the relation between Salafists and state that was collected show a generalized picture of good and bad. The believer must decide between both, while the interpretation of what is considered as such was already drawn. It is argued that the participation inside democratic systems is forbidden; It is difficult for young Muslims to express there needs and find their role and identity inside their home country, if it is not possible for them to engage inside a political system.

2.3.2 The Society and Muslims

The content is giving the indication that the society is a bad influence for believers. It is not something the authors of the content think that they are part of, or Muslims should be. Western lifestyle is often addressed with the Music, that is considered as drug which detracts people in their believe in God. The relation between men and women is another topic seen as problematic.

The content shows that society is seen as all the people who are not living after the religious rules of Islam. The “pure” Muslim Youth are in the eyes of the authors at a high risk of being drawn into actions which are prohibited. The stigmatic term society is showing everything what is not allowed. The negative on the one hand is controversial to a missing positive picture but can be assumed as a society dominated by Muslims, living under *Sharia* law.

The content shows that society is seen as all the people who are not living after the religious rules of Islam. The “pure” Muslim Youth are in the eyes of the authors at a high risk of being drawn into actions which are prohibited. The stig-



matic term society is showing everything what is not allowed. The negative on the one hand is controversial to a missing positive picture but can be assumed as a society dominated by Muslims, living under *Sharia* law.

To understand better the meaning of what the “Western Lifestyle” is or habits of “Western society” are, the definition of the word must be under review. Most of the posts were standing alone and had critical viewpoints on the society promoting individualism, and materialism behavior.

The Content showed that women had to be protected from bad influences. Dress decadence was one of the mentioned dangers, that change women to attractive figures that can lead to adultery and destroy Families.

The only way of women and man being together should be in marriage. And there is no room and no places where they should meet each other in public. A strict separation of both Sexes is important for believers but in his strictness a outstanding Scale inside the believe system of Salafism and is opening up questions regarding, schools, universities, work, and public places were a separation is not given, wanted and seen, in France and in Germany.

The topic music is presented in many posts. It is not a critical viewpoint on the music or the music industry. The Music by itself is seen as a distraction, and a perversion that lead to much worsen habits and crimes. The Process that Music leads to crimes, rapes, violence against women, drugs (like Cocaine [Shown in one example]), is a over overreaction, and a dangerous connection. After such believe a indicator for dangerous actions, can be seen in every smartphone, subway station, car, or shopping mall.

2.3.3 *Salafists and Muslims*

The model describes the relationship between *Salafists* and Muslims. The members of the Channels are seeing themselves as preachers that must worn Muslims about different things that are in their understanding not right. The goal is to lead the majority of the Muslim community away from other actors as far as possible. In Conclusion a clear line can be drawn, between “us” seen as good (in the *Salafists* understanding of Islam) and “them” (seen as bad). The actor Non-Believers is represented with his habits inside the society. The Muslim Brotherhood are seen as modern Innovators because of their participation in elections. The same goes for *Salafist* preachers that are considered moderates. Cults, are seen most of the time in members of Sufism. In their belief they are changing Islam to a perversion of itself. And Shia, a separation between Sunni and Shia is considered as quite common but mentioned because of the aggressive Content found in this regard.



The Content was ordered into 4 parts.

The first part describes how members of the postings seeing themselves. As a unique group of Muslims that want to go back to the basics of Islam – without any addition or reduction. The bigger part of the Muslim Community is supposed to follow them on the path of truth and therefore have to be reminded what it is and what the innovations are. This begs the question: who decide what an innovation is? The authors of the posting as well the *Salafi* movement itself are divided into many groups which are often separated after the interpretation of what is allowed (i.e. Quran and Sunnah) and what is forbidden (i.e. was innovated). One characteristic is hyper morality that can be seen in many postings and is separating the authors from “most Muslims.”

The second part shows examples of expectations, the authors of the posting have towards other Muslims. Some show obvious exterior expectations, as clothing or haircuts of women that must be different to those of a non-believer. The wearing of a niqab, that covers up the face of a women often is expected. Other expectations are thematizing the apostasy of Muslims, that should and have to be separated from the disbelievers. The goal is to convince other Muslims to follow rules and interpretations that are not established inside the Muslim community and are not seen as obligations.

The third part gives an indication of the diversity of the Salafi Movement. Salafist preachers that are giving indications of statements which are opening space for engagement between Muslims and Non-Muslims, or between Muslims inside a democratic system that are considered as “moderate” and a distraction for the “real Muslims”.

Imams who are perceived as too close to the state, the system, or their values, supposedly lose their values for the Muslims. Some postings can be understood as warnings against Muslims that have patriotic feelings to their nation or trying to build bridges between people of different faith. The audience is supposed to rethink the attachment to people who are showing indications of “separation” form the believes of the authors. A single decision can turn one from a Muslim into a “Innovator” of the Religion. This is seen as a danger for all other Muslims that follow the pure path and always are in danger of a distraction, that moves them away from the right path.

Two kinds of preachers are thus defined: one is strictly separating the Muslims from the rest of society, with the intention to secure the unchanged behaviours, that are extracted from past interpretations. Sometimes also taken out of Interpretations by scholars which are important figures in the *Salafi* Movement like Ibn Taimiya (1263-1328) or Ibn-Qaiyim (1292-1359).



The other (described in the Quotations below) is perverting the true message. Preachers who are doing this become enemies of Islam. Terms like “ignorant”, “separative”, “lost”, “cultic” “moderated” or “soft” are often used adjectives to describe that no one should “trap” to become likeable to other, available positions. This is also stopping any debate on the subject immediately by defining the opposing standpoint as a danger to one’s own believe.

The fourth part is showing content that represents the attitude regarding Sufism. One of the outstanding traits of this group is to declare Muslims to Non-Muslims. The high level of judgment can be seen regarding people that are Muslims but not in the understanding of the authors that declare themselves to judges of different forms of believe: similar to the “moderated preachers” Sufism is destroying Islam. The difference between both is that - while the “moderated preachers” are seen mostly as misguided Muslims - Sufis are excluded from the Muslim Community. It shows the intolerance of the Group regarding other interpretations.

2.3.4 Believers and Non-Believers

Two parts are summarizing the Information that was gathered through the posts on social media. The difference between the Platform selection, Germany (Telegram), France (Twitter), can be seen in the Content. Telegram is not as strict with deleting of radical Content than Twitter.

The first part separates people into believers and non-believers. The latter is always defined with positive characteristics; a non-Believer with bad ones. The believer is following the truth and therefore separates himself from its counterpart. The truth is what the Quran and Sunnah are describing. Therefore, someone who is not following this path, inside the Quran or Sunnah, is on another path. It’s a clear cut between right and wrong. There are strict lines. The content is showing a definitive understanding of people. There are no ambivalences or further possibilities by which people could be recognized. But who is deciding? The leading scholar can separate people: enemy, friend and misguided. Postings often show missing connections to people that are not Muslim. And the danger of an unknown opposing force, that wants to destroy their believes and religion. Separation is strict and does leave hardly any room for interactions between people and arguments.

The second part of the Graphic is quoting examples of the content, that is strengthening the separation between believer and non-believer. The only way of interaction is the invitation to the Kaffir to become Muslim. On the other side, the Kaffir is seen as somebody who wants to convert Muslims to his believe system.



Coexistence of both is often dominated by the idea that the opposing side wants to integrate the other by controlling its actions and beliefs, and therefore destroys the opposing believe structure.

The channels warn others to be careful of not becoming corrupted by disbelievers, so that the religion is protected by outside influences. While the Kaffirs (Disbelievers) are accused to be intolerant, by willing to change everything the Religion should be, the authors are equally intolerant of other religions, leaving them the option of conversion or separation. It goes back to the believe that if they do not invite them to Islam, the other (Kaffir) is going to hell. So, the only way for him to be saved is his conversion. The other religion is often seen as a misguided, a false one. People should not discuss, what can lead to subspecies beliefs about the unknown opposite group. It shows a disconnection inside a society, that makes it difficult to work together and master challenges, even just for some time. It is a picture of “us” versus “them.” Some posting indicate a sign of discrimination or bad experience with people that belong to society’s’ majority.

The debate is dominated by the generalization of people into concepts. Often, quotations are used from past scholars. Quoting out of context is one of the issues found out by the researchers in many analysed postings. A viewer that is scrolling from one to another, is not understanding any of the deeper meaning of knowledge, that grounds the quotation. When was the source living? What were the circumstances of his times? What was the context of the quote? It is taken out of context and perspective; then thrown into the present. The viewer tries to find meaning inside the current time; without understanding the deeper historical perspective of it. It is important to describe historical context, descriptions, and perspectives.

2.4 Violent Propaganda

The content in this chapter must be reviewed separately. While all other Channels were separating themselves from Violence and try to separate themselves as well as the Salafi Movement from actions of Terror, this is not the case regarding three Telegram Channels that had been collected for further review. All the Content was collected through three Channels, from Telegram, and in German speaking language.

The first channel can be understood as a supporter channel for global jihad. Often bringing the viewer into a scenario that he should decide if he wants to become a hero, by fighting for the Interest of God, for the suffering Muslim Community in the Arabic world, or be a powerless observer of the injustice that Muslims have to suffer from. Regarding the Content that was watched, there are



indications of a male living in Germany and has connections to a Salafi understanding of Islam. The danger here is the stereotyping of an enemy that is basically an attacker of Muslims. The owner of the Channel is forcing people to believe that they should be heroes by joining worldwide Jihad against injustice in the Muslim World. The Channel is showing a wide spectrum of Content, so it is hiding sometimes his support of violence by speaking of day to day life in a society seen as weak and passive regarding the support of the real problems in the Muslim World. The creation of a Situation that people should chose between Hero or Loser can be seen in many of his posts.

The second one is run by a user that is part of a German speaking terror group operating out of Idlib, Syria. The content is defining Assad as the main enemy of the group and many postings are showing combat experience of the fighters against the Syrian army. The group is fundraising money, while addressing implicit people from Germany to support them so they can buy equipment and weapons. The scenes that are shown in videos on the channels site are brutal; the dead of an opposing fighter is seen as a victories act. In other videos it was made clear that the dead of an enemy is worthless, and the opposing powers (America, Syrian Army) are dehumanized in many occasions. The picture that they present are often speaking of Brothers and Siblings that are fighting a demonized enemy. With the word Brother they link a connection to the viewer, that is pushed into a belief that they are fighting, killing, and dying for him, while he is just watching, it draws someone inside from passive to active. The violence inside the video is shocking and together with the direct integration of the viewer by the words they use, it lets people become close to them.

The third channel is showing propaganda material from terror organizations like IS, and fighting songs are uploaded inside the Telegram group. The Scope of posts are limited, but in his meaning and message clear. Most of the Content is posted in the year 2020.

3 Evaluation of the Questionnaire

3.1 In General: About the Participants

The subchapter is giving an overview of the background of each participant and their Organization. The surveys were answered between the 04.03 and 21.05.2020. The Results should help inside the decision making: What are our recommendations of tackling the phenomenon of radicalization?

The Online Survey was answered by 113 Organizations and Social Workers, that were selected after one of the following Criterion: working together ...



- A) with young people in the age of our target group (youth Clubs, Organizations that have experience with our target group)
- B) with young Muslims particular (Muslim Organizations, and their youth sections)

All the selections must be

- C) active in the Partners local area

The survey was available online in five languages (Spanish, Italian, German, French, English). The chosen language can provide an overview of the country and the area the participant is active. The survey also asked about the name of the organization, but the answer especially regarding a sensible topic that is analyzed inside the OPEN project should not be a prerequisite. A total of 11 organizations describe themselves as Muslim organizations. Most Muslim organizations are from Germany (4) and Spain (4). Most answers that are presented in the following are given by non-Muslim-Participants (91%).

The total (113) answered surveys can be split up into the languages: Spanish (35), Italian (35), German (25), French (14), English (4).

The majority of participation is active on the social media (90 out of 113= 79,64%). From those who are active on a social media platform (Total:90) we wanted to know, what kind of Platform they prefer to use. Most of the participants (113) that are active in social Media, use the platform Facebook (82), Instagram (45), YouTube (40), Twitter (32) and 18 are active inside all the mentioned platforms. Besides that, some Organizations were active on other smaller social media platforms, but only single cases were reported.

3.2 Challenges for young People

The tables show the differences of the answers, between the countries, the participants, and their organizations where they are operating from. We exclude all the organizations that do not gave an answer to the question, when calculating the percentages



a) Question: What problems do young people have to face? Job possibility

Language the survey was answered (Area OPEN Partner)	Percentage, Participants see Job possibility as a struggle young people must face. (total)	Percentage, Participants see Low Income Jobs as a struggle young people must face. (total)	Percentage, Participants see the need for Spaces for social aggregation as a struggle young people must face. (total)	Percentage, Participants see High apartment rents as a struggle young people must face. (total)	Percentage, Participants see a social exclusion as a struggle young people must face. (total)	Percentage, Participants see Drug abuse as a struggle young people must face. (total)	Percentage, Participants see a religious radicalization as a struggle young people must face. (total)
Spanish (Alicante)	80,0% (24)	73,33% (22)	16,67% (5)	56,67% (17)	40% (12)	33,33% (10)	3,33% (1)
Italian (Rom)	89,66% (26)	58,62% (17)	55,17% (16)	55,17% (16)	72,41% (21)	34,48% (10)	3,45% (1)
German (Berlin)	23,8% (5)	28,57% (6)	19,05% (4)	38,09% (8)	28,57% (6)	33,33% (7)	52,38% (11)
French (Strasbourg/ Nizza)	61,54% (8)	38,46% (5)	30,77% (4)	76,92% (10)	38,46% (5)	38,46% (5)	46,15% (6)
English	75% (3)	50% (2)	25% (1)	50% (2)	50% (2)	50% (2)	25% (1)
In total	68,04%	53,61%	30,93% (30)	54,64% (53)	47,42% (46)	35,05% (34)	20,62% (20)



In Italy and Spain, organizations are more worried on the job possibilities for young people, while in Germany this is not seen as a difficulty, what let the overall percentage for all Countries fall drastically. If Germany (makes up for more than half of negative answers) was excluded. It can be said that inside Spain, Italy, and France (all English answered Surveys cant be included; they could be from Germany as well), CSOs answered with a percentage of 80,55% that Job possibility is an issue [Yes:58, No:14, NA:12].

Like the question of Job possibilities, Spain and Italy are countries were the question of Low-Income Jobs was a problem among young people, while Germany and France are not agreeing to the statement.

The living expenses for young people were seen as a problem in all partners countries, besides Germany.

- b) How would your Organization describe the socio-economic situation of young Muslims compared to other young people in your area?

In total 26 participants were answering the question with [No difference to other young people], 38 [Little worser than other young people], 23 Very bad compared to other young people], 26 organizations didn't gave a answer to the question.

The data show that the participants are seeing a difference between young Muslims and non-Muslims regarding their socio-economic situation.

3.3 Radicalization of young Muslims

- a) Do you see a problem of Muslim youth radicalization in your city?
Yes [23], No[35], I don't know [29], No Answer [26]

From the 23 participants that answered with Yes: 13 Germany, 2 Spain, 5 France, 3 Italy.



**b) What kind of causes do you see for the radicalization of young Muslims?
[Social exclusion]**

Language the survey was answered (Area OPEN Partner)	Percentage, Participants see Social exclusion as a cause for the radicalization of young Muslims	Percentage, Participants see Islam through Social Media “education” as a cause for the radicalization of young Muslims	Percentage, Participants see “hyper morality” as a cause for the radicalization of young Muslims	Percentage, Participants see Islam as only politics as a cause for the radicalization of young Muslims	Percentage, Participants see A lack of knowledge of Islam as a cause for the radicalization of young Muslims	Percentage, Participants see No connection to Islamic Community as a cause for the radicalization of young Muslims
Spanish (Alicante)	50,00% (15)	33,33% (10)	20,00% (6)	13,33% (4)	36,67% (11)	10,00% (3)
Italian (Rom)	82,75% (24)	13,79% (4)	10,35% (3)	6,90% (2)	68,97% (20)	17,24% (5)
German (Berlin)	33,33% (7)	52,38% (11)	47,62% (10)	42,86% (9)	38,10% (8)	19,05% (4)
French (Strasbourg/ Nizza)	53,85% (7)	38,46% (5)	15,39% (2)	23,08% (3)	46,15% (6)	15,39% (2)
English	50% (2)	25,00% (1)	0% (0)	0% (0)	25,00% (1)	25,00% (1)
In total	56,7% (55)	31,96% (31)	27,63% (21)	18,56% (18)	47,42% (46)	15,46% (15)



In Germany 2 out of 3 professionals that were asked, do not think that social exclusion is a reason for the possible radicalization of young people. In all the other countries it is nearly equal answers between yes and no. A exception can be seen in Italy were most of the professionals that were asked, agree that social exclusion is the reason for a radicalization of young Muslims (82,75%).

There was also the opportunity to give a self chosen answer to the phenomenon. Below there are some examples that were expressed.

One organization was mentioning a lack of international relations and political education for young people. Another one argued that there was not enough neutral Media presence, that can help for a neutral understanding of Islam. Economic circumstances were named. An interesting statement came from an Italian organization that claimed that the subject of radicalization can be visible and powerful, something the radicalized person could not experience in their “normal” life.

c) Have you ever had experience with radical young Muslims in the past?

Language the survey was answered (Area OPEN Partner)	Percentage, Participants had experience with radical young Muslims in the past	Percentage, Participants experienced the radicalization of young Muslims through social media
Spanish (Alicante)	11,11% (3)	20,00% (5)
Italian (Rom)	18,52% (5)	21,43% (6)
German (Berlin)	77,78% (14)	63,16% (12)
French (Strasbourg/Nizza)	61,53% (8)	50,00% (6)
English	25,00% (1)	0% (0)
In total	35,23% (31)	33,33% (29)



Most of the CSOs never had experience with radical Muslims before. In France and in Germany, this is the opposite way around. What fits to our online research.

3.4 Statements regarding a possible campaign

- a) In the following, some statements on deradicalization strategies, that were found in the literature review are presented. All the answers above 20 are highlighted in light blue.

Statement 1

How do you agree with the following sentences: [Real education of Muslims usually needs to be connected to a proper understanding of Islam, Iman and Ihsan, based on one of the accepted Islamic Schools of Law (Maliki, Hanifi etc). All the schools exclude any form of radicalism or violence. This kind of education is the main topic to be strengthened to counter radicalization.]

Statement 2

How do you agree with the following statements: [The social situation of young Muslims is of high relevance (job, identity, rights) and has to be improved in order to counter radicalization. Often simple frustration is the base for possible radicalization.]

Statement 3

How do you agree with the following statements: [Young Muslims with an immigrant background feel often not accepted as Europeans. Young Muslims must be introduced to the possibility of a Muslim and European identity to counter radicalization].

Answer Possibility	No. of participation Statement 1	No. of participation Statement 2	No. of participation Statement 3
Very	26	25	34
Quite	31	32	21
Little	8	14	12
Not at all	8	11	12
I do not know	15	6	5



a) Are you aware of offers for young Muslims in your area for political or cultural education? Are you aware of offers for interexchange between young people with different faith background?

Language the survey was answered (Area OPEN Partner)	Percentage, Participants are aware of offers for young Muslims regarding political or cultural education	Percentage, Participants are aware of offers for interexchange between young people with different faith background
Spanish (Alicante)	10,53% (2)	31,58% (6)
Italian (Rom)	25,93% (7)	44,44% (12)
German (Berlin)	33,33% (3)	44,44% (4)
French (Strasbourg/Nizza)	40,00% (2)	40,00% (2)
English	0% (0)	0% (0)
In total	22,58% (14)	38,71% (24)

Both Answers indicate that there can be a need inside the Partners region for Offers in this regard.



References

Beauftragte der Bundesregierung für Migration, Flüchtlinge und Integration, 10. Bericht der Beauftragten der Bundesregierung für Migration, Flüchtlinge und Integration über die Lage der Ausländerinnen und Ausländer in Deutschland (Oktober 2014), <https://www.bundesregierung.de/resource/blob/973812/430396/34552fb4d869bfe17d5fb731b82ca49a/2014-10-29-lagebericht-presse-kurz-data.pdf?download=1>, accessed 25 April 2020.

CITCO, Secretaría Estado Seguridad. 'Plan Estratégico Nacional de Lucha contra la Radicalización Violenta'.

Comité interministériel de prévention de la délinquance et de la radicalisation, Le Plan National de Prévention de la Radicalisation (PNPR), <https://www.cipdr.gouv.fr/prevenir-la-radicalisation/mise-en-oeuvre-du-pnpr/>, accessed 06 April 2020.

Demographic study of Muslim population. statistical exploitation of the census of Muslim citizens in Spain referred to as of 12/31/2019. <<http://observatorio.hispanomuslim.es/estademograf.pdf>.

El Mundo. (2007). "El rechazo a los musulmanes en España es una realidad creciente", según estudios de la UE'. El Mundo.

Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, Handlungsempfehlungen zur Auseinandersetzung mit islamistischen Extremismus und Islamfeindlichkeit, 2015.

R. Guolo, Jihadisti d'Italia La radicalizzazione islamista nel nostro paese, Edizioni Angelo Guerini e Associati, 2018.

R. Guolo, Sociologia dell'Islam, Editore Mondadori Education, 2016.

IFOP, Etat des lieux des discriminations et des agressions envers les musulmans de France, <https://www.ifop.com/publication/etat-des-lieux-des-discriminations-et-des-agressions-envers-les-musulmans-de-france/>, 2019, accessed 10 April 2020.

Ministère de l'Éducation Nationale et de la Jeunesse, Prevenir la radicalisation des jeunes, http://cache.media.education.gouv.fr/file/02_-_fevrier/76/8/Prevenir-la-radicalisation-des-jeunes_390768.pdf, accessed 17 April 2020.

Reinares, F., García-Calvo, C., & Vicente, Á. 2017. 'Dos factores que explican la radicalización yihadista en España'. Real Instituto Elcano Royal Institute. 9 aug.



la Repubblica, Islam, firmato Patto con associazioni di musulmani. Viminale: "Verso l'intesa", https://www.repubblica.it/politica/2017/02/01/news/viminale_moschee_minniti_islam-157375602, last access 16/03/2020.

S. Zaninelli, Crema. Il valore della differenza secondo i Giovani musulmani. Sabato il convegno su integrazione e convivenza pacifica, www.cremaonline.it, giugno 2015.

<https://iers.unive.it/> and <https://soraps.unive.it/>, last access 16/03/2020.

